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Making Waves:
Circumventing Domestic Law on the High Seas
Shannon Renton Wolf
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, a state's treatment of its own citizens was purely a
domestic matter. However, with the development of international human
rights law and after the horrific tragedies of World War II, the international
community recognized a need to create standards to regulate the conduct of
a state within its own territory and the treatment of its own citizens. 1 This
area of the law has led to many questions concerning the extent to which
limitations may be imposed on a state's power to control private conduct
within its territorial boundaries. Although state sovereignty is a basic
principle underlying international law, international human rights law
proclaims certain fundamental and inalienable rights for every human
being. 2 Therefore, states have a duty to protect certain human rights of
their citizens and the international community has a right and responsibility
to protest if these rights are violated. 3
Numerous international and regional instruments, including Article
16(1)(e) of the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (Women's Convention), recognize rights
concerning reproductive choice, such as the right to found a family, the
right to decide the number and spacing of children, the right to family
planning information and education, and the right to access family planning
services. 4 With regard to abortion, international instruments are largely
• J.D. Candidate, May 2003, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. B.A.,
2000, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. I wish to thank Professor Harry Prince for his
comments and my family for their support. This Note was inspired by an article, Special
Report: Making Waves, by Elinor Burkett, that appeared in the September 2001 issue of Elle
Magazine.
1. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 813 (3d ed. 1999).
2. CORINNE A.A. PACKER, THE RIGHT TO REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE: A STUDY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1996).
3. Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of International Human Rights Law, in GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 3, 3 (Hurst Hannum ed., 2d ed. 1992).
4. See PACKER, supra note 2, at 23-4l.
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unhelpful. 5 For instance, the Women's Convention provides little guidance
in this area, largely because in order to achieve political consensus and
accommodate a broad spectrum of cultures, the language of the family
planning provisions was drafted in vague terms. 6 Within international
documents there is no explicit provision recognizing the right to abortion,
yet there is no explicit denial of such a right.7 Therefore, international
human rights texts create considerable uncertainty over whether the
concept of the right to reproductive choice encompasses abortion. 8 Some
proponents of the right to abortion argue that such a right may be implied
under other provisions that guarantee a right to privacy and a right to
liberty.9 Therefore, a state may not interfere with a woman's decision
concerning her pregnancy.IO In addition, some advocate a positive
obligation on the state to provide access to abortion under provisions that
guarantee a right to health, equality, and self-detennination. 11 On the other
hand, arguments have been made that international law mandates a ban on
abortion by extending right to life provisions to protect the unborn. 12
Despite these interpretations, states have been left to detennine their own
policies concerning this highly charged issue that implicates deeply held
views regarding family, gender, and religion. 13
Abortion laws around the world permit abortion for four reasons: "(1) a
risk to the life of the mother, (2) for 'medical reasons', (3) for medical or
social reasons, and (4) on request or on demand.,,14 Presently, Ireland falls
into the first category.
Abortion was criminalized in Ireland under section 58 of the Offences
Against the Person Act of 1861. 15 However, in 1981 pro-life activists
pushed for an amendment to the Constitution to prevent the judiciary from
interpreting a right to abortion similar to the Roe v. Wade decision. 16 A
referendum for the Eighth Amendment was held on September 7, 1983.17
A two-to-one majority approved the amendment. IS
The Eighth
5. Id. at 72-73.
6. Jd. at 73.
7. Id. at 73-74.
8. Id. at 73.
9. JAMES KINGSTON & ANTHONY WHELAN, ABORTION AND THE LAW 79-80 (1997).
10. Id. at 80.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 79.
l3, Id. at 80.
14. G. Diane Lee, Comment, Ireland's Constitutional Protection 0/ the Unborn: Is it in
Danger?, 7 TULSA J. COMPo & INT'L L. 413, 438 (2000).
15. Offenses Against the Person Act, 1861,24 & 25 Vict., c.I00, § 58 (U.K.) (remaining

in force following Ireland's independence).
16. Amy M. Buckley, The Primacy 0/ Democracy Over Natural Law in Irish Abortion
Law: An Examination o/the C Case, 9 DUKEJ. COMPo & INT'L L. 275, 281-83 (1998).
17. Rachel A. Yorke, Tiocfiadh Ar La: Ireland's Struggle With Abortion, 5 NEW ENG.
INT'L& COMPo L. ANN. 83, 85 (1999).
18. Carol Coulter, Turbulent History 0/ the Abortion Issue, IRISH TIMES, Nov. 16,2000,
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Amendment provides, "The State acknowledges the right to life of the
unborn and, with due regard to the equal life of the mother, guarantees in
its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and
vindicate that right."l9
However, almost ten years later, in Attorney General v. X (1992), the
Irish Supreme Court held that abortion is legally permissible if the
pregnancy presents a real and substantial threat to the mother's life,zo The
facts giving rise to this case concerned a fourteen-year-old girl who was
raped by her father's friend and wanted to travel to England for an
abortion,zl The Court considered her suicidal mental state as a real and
substantial risk to her health. 22
All five justices recognized an
unenumerated fundamental right to travel. 23 Yet three of the justices
argued that such a right is subordinate to the right to life of the unborn if
there is no real or substantial risk to the mother's health,z4
In the wake of the X decision, a referendum was held on the abortion
issue,zs The government presented three proposals: 1) guaranteeing the
right to travel to other European Community states for abortions, 2)
information regarding abortion would be freely available in Ireland, and 3)
adding to article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution: "It shall be unlawful to
terminate the life of the unborn unless such termination is necessary to save
the life, as distinct from the health, of the mother where there is an illness
or disorder of the mother giving rise to a real and substantive risk to her
life, not being a risk of self-destruction.,,26
The first two proposals reflected a reversal of the Irish government's
position in Society for the Protection of the Unborn (S.P. U. C.) v. Open
Door Counselling and Dublin Well Woman Centre and s.P. u.C. v. Grogan,
restricting the right to travel and right to information on abortion.27
However, the purpose of the third proposal was to narrow the holding of
the X case by rejecting suicide as a real and substantial risk to the health of
the mother. 28 Irish voters approved the first two proposals, however the
last proposal was rejected. 29 Both of the approved proposals were
incorporated into the Irish Constitution as Amendments Thirteen and
Fourteen on December 3, 1992. 30
at 6.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Art. 40.3.3, Constitution ofIreland, 1983; see also Yorke, supra note 17, at 85.
Yorke, supra note 17, at 94-95.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 95.
Id.
Id.
Yorke, supra note 17, at 96.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Art. 40.3.3, Constitution ofIreland, (1992); Yorke, supra note 17, at 96-97.
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The liberalization of abortion law in Ireland may be attributed to the
modernizing influence of the European Court of Human Rights and the
European Court of Justice, which handed down decisions in Grogan (1991)
and Open Door (1993) establishing that Ireland did not have broad
discretion to restrict the right to travel or the right to freedom of
information if the restnctIons violated European Union law. 3l
Furthermore, the X Case illustrates that in individual cases it is difficult for
Ireland to maintain a policy of moral absolutism when faced with horrific
facts. 32 In addition, increasing popular support in Ireland to expand
abortion rights has provided an important impetus for change. A poll in
March 2001 by Lansdowne Market Research indicated that 79% of the
Irish people favor the availability of abortion in certain circumstances and
62% believe that in these circumstances women should be able to receive
abortion services in Ireland. 33
Despite progress in Irish abortion law, the issue remains hotly
contested and is by no means settled. The reluctance of politicians to risk
their jobs has impeded the development of much needed legislation. 34
Furthermore, the Medical Council's ethical guidelines are not in
accordance with the X ruling. 35 While the X case held that abortion is
permitted if there is a real and substantial risk to the mother, the ethical
guidelines prohibit abortion, except when it is a by-product of "standard
medical treatment of the mother.,,36 Much confusion remains considering
the "strange state of abortion law, suspended somewhere between the 19th
century Offences Against the Person Act and the Supreme Court judgment
in the X case, which the Oireachtas [the Irish Parliament] has failed to
embody in legislation.,,37
Although women are not able to request an abortion on demand in
Ireland, the abortion law clearly establishes that Irish women may
circumvent domestic law and travel to European Union states that offer
legal abortion services. The most obvious option is to cross the Irish Sea

31. Abigail-Mary E. W. Sterling, Note, The European Union and Abortion Tourism:
Liberalizing Ireland's Abortion Law, 20 B.C. INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 385,406 (1997).
32. Yorke, supra note 17, at 101.
. .
33. Kitty Holland & Frank McNally, Irish Should Not Have to Travel/or Abortion-Poll,
IRISH TIMES, June 1,2001, at 5. The circumstances isolated in the poll included "when the
woman's life is at risk by continuation of the pregnancy," rape or incest, where the
pregnancy would cause irreparable damage to the health of the woman, when the woman
was at risk of suicide, when the fetus had a disorder that was incompatable with life, when
the woman believed that, for her, it was the right choice, and reasons such as family size,
economic and social circumstances. Id. 16% of respondents said that abortion should not
be available for any reason whatsoever. /d.
34. Yorke, supra note 17, at 97.
35. Coulter, supra note 18, at 6.
36. /d.
37. Fintan O'Toole, Abortion Hearings are Calm but no Consensus is in Sight, IRISH
TIMES, May 6, 2000, at 8.
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and go to a clinic in England. In 1999, it was reported that over 6,000
women with Irish addresses had abortions in Britain. 38 However, this
number does not indicate the number of women who want to terminate
their pregnancies but cannot afford to travel considering that a typical
journey to England costs about $1,150. 39
In response, Dr. Rebecca Gomperts, a Dutch abortion doctor, came up
with a rather radical idea to address the inaccessibility of abortion services
in countries such as Ireland.
Dr. Gomperts created a non-profit
organization, Women on Waves,40 and raised funds in order to sail a Dutchregistered ship to countries where abortion is either illegal or difficult to
obtain. To circumvent domestic law she planned to perform abortions in
international waters. 41 Since abortion is legal in the Netherlands and the
law of the flag state applies in international waters, the abortions would be
lawful, according to Dr. Gomperts. 42
Dr. Gomperts' mission became a reality when she set sail on the
Aurora and arrived in Dublin's port on June 15, 2001. 43 However, when
the Dutch Justice Minister Albert Korthals announced that the medical
team had not obtained the correct license to conduct abortions, her plans
collapsed. 44 Instead, Gomperts and her team were only able to provide
family planning advice, despite the estimated 250 women desperate for
abortions. 45 Although Dr. Gomperts was not able to carry through with her
initial plans, she hopes to obtain more funds, complete the necessary
paperwork, and return to Ireland. 46
The Women on Waves organization raises a host of issues involving
international law, state sovereignty, the law of the sea, and human rights.
Although there are a variety of substantive legal questions that follow in
light of the European Human Rights Convention and European Union Law,
this Note will focus primarily on whether Ireland even has legal authority
to assert jurisdiction over Irish nationals or Dutch nationals aboard the
"abortion ship." Part II of this Note will provide a legal background on the
traditional bases of jurisdiction in international law, customary and
conventional international law of the sea (focusing on the 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention), and Irish law of the sea. Part III will analyze the
potential arguments that Ireland may raise in asserting jurisdiction and the
38. Frank McNally, Record Number of Irish Abortions in Britain, IRISH TIMES, June 7,
2000, at 5.
39. Sara Corbett, The Pro-Choice Extremist, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2001, § 6 (Magazine),
at 22.
40. Women on Waves, For a Safe and Legal Choice, at http://www.womeonwaves.org
(last visited May 1,2003)..
4l. Corbett, supra note 39, at 22.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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counter-arguments that may shield those on board the abortion ship from
legal action.

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Within international law, jurisdictional issues are usually distinguished
between the jurisdiction to prescribe law and the jurisdiction to enforce
law. 47 Recently however, international law jurisdiction has been more
narrowly defined to include a third category, jurisdiction to adjudicate,
which is the authority of a state to subject persons or things to its judicial
system. 48 The jurisdictional issue discussed in this Note is whether Ireland
has the jurisdiction to prescribe its laws, or whether Irish substantive law is
applicable.
A. INTERNATIONAL BASES OF JURISDICTION
There are five customary principles of prescriptive jurisdiction within
international law: 1) territorial principle, 2) nationality principle, 3) passive
personality principle, 4) protective principle, and 5) universal theory.49
The territorial principle recognizes exclusive jurisdiction to prescribe
and enforce law regarding conduct that occurs within the state's borders. 5o
Therefore, a state may assert jurisdiction over criminal conduct that occurs
within the sovereign state's territory despite the nationality of the
perpetrator. 5I Consequently, aliens cannot escape jurisdiction except in
instances in which there is some special immunity that does not subject the
alien to local law, or the local law is not in conformity with international
law. 52 However, these are very limited exceptions. 53
Under the nationality principle, sovereign states have the authority to
define the conduct of their own citizens and assert jurisdiction over
nationals regardless of where the conduct occurred. 54 Similarly, the passive
personality principle allows states to assume jurisdiction over offenses
committed against victims who are nationals. 55 This theory of jurisdiction
is based on the idea that states have an interest in punishing perpetrators of
crimes against their citizens 56 and protecting their citizens abroad. 57
47. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 1, at 710.
48. !d. at 710-11.
49. Id. at 712.
50. Laura L. Roos, Stateless Vessels and the High Seas Narcotics Trade: United States
Courts Deviate From International Principles of Jurisdiction, 9 MAR. LAW. 273, 275
(1984).
51. Id. at 276.
52. J.O. STARKE, INTRODUCTlONTO INTERNATlONALLAW 209 (lOth ed. 1989).
53. Id. at 210 (noting the exceptions from and restrictions upon territorial jurisdiction,
including foreign states and heads of foreign states, diplomatic representatives and consuls,
public ships of foreign states, armed forces of foreign states, and international institutions).
54. Roos, supra note 50, at 276.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 276-77.
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Therefore, under the passive personality principle a state may apply its
laws against a foreign national for acts committed outside the state's
territory against its citizens.
The protective principle of jurisdiction focuses on the effect or
potential effect of an offense and provides for jurisdiction over hannful
conduct which has consequences of the utmost gravity for the state. 58
Conduct that threatens security, territorial integrity, and political
independence of a state justifies asserting this type of jurisdiction. 59
However, this theory of jurisdiction has been criticized for potentially
allowing states to judge subjectively what conduct is particularly hannful,
and could, therefore, result in arbitrary decisionmaking. 6o
The universal theory of jurisdiction provides authority for a state to
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over a perpetrator that commits a
particularly heinous offense such as piracy, slave trafficking, war crimes,
hijacking and sabotage of aircraft, genocide, and terrorism. 61 Trafficking
narcotic drugs is currently not recognized as a customary basis for asserting
universal jurisdiction, however there are international agreements that
provide for such jurisdiction. 62
B. CUSTOMARY AND CONVENTIONAL INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA
The two primary sources of international law of the sea are
international customary law and treaties. Rules become customary law
when: "(i) a particular usage is habitually observed by the generality of
States; and (ii) they observe that usage out of a feeling of legal
obligation.,,63 Treaties create legally binding obligations only for the
parties who have ratified the treaty. However, a treaty may provide a
model from which international customary law develops.64
Prior to the twentieth century, international law of the sea consisted
predominantly of customary law, which was largely based on the freedom
of the seas, or rather that no single state or group of states could assert
sovereignty over the seas. 65 However, throughout history there has been a
tension between preserving the freedom of navigation and recognizing
territorial sovereignty.66 Specifically, coastal states became concerned with
smuggling and anned attacks, and therefore wanted to exert some control

57. STARKE, supra note 52, at 233.
58. Roos, supra note 50, at 276.

59. /d.
60. STARKE, supra note 52, at 233-34.
61. Roos, supra note 50, at 234.

62. ld.
63. 1 EDWARD DUNCAN BROWN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA: INTRODUCTORY
MANUAL 3 (1994).

64. ld.
65. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note I, at 928.

66. ld. at 928-29.
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over conduct in the waters adjacent to the coast. 67 The conflict between
these competing interests has been exemplified in disagreements over the
length of the territorial sea, which is the area of the adjacent water over
which states can exercise sovereignty.68
During the twentieth century, there qaye, been, several motivating
factors encouraging codification of the law of the sea~ including the
increasing depletion of fishery stocks and the threat of technological
exploitation of the ocean. 69 Finally, the United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea in 1958 led to the codification of a majority of the
customary rules in four treaties: The Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone, the Convention on the Continental Shelf, the Convention
on the High Seas, and the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of
Living Resources of the High Seas. 70 These treaties are collectively
referred to as the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea. 71 However,
at this conference the parties were unable to come to an agreement
regarding the breadth of the territorial sea.72
After an unsuccessful second conference, the third United Nations
conference led to creation of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (LOSC).73 The LOSC largely superseded the Geneva
Conventions and came into force in November 1994. Ireland signed the
LOSC in 1982 and ratified the treaty on July 21, 1996. 74 The Netherlands
also signed the treaty on December 10, 1982, and ratified the LOSC on
June 28, 1996. 75
One of the major successes of the LOS Convention, including an
agreement on the maximum breadth of the territorial sea at twelve miles, is
an outline of the zones of the sea and delineation of where coastal states
and other states have various rights. 76 These zones include the internal
waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic
zone, the continental shelf, and the high seas. 77
67. Jd. at 929.
68. Jd.
69. Jd.

70. 1 BROWN, supra note 63, at 3
71. Jd.

72. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 1, at 929.
73. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 l.L.M. 1261; see also 1
BROWN, supra note 61, at 3.
74. CLNE R. SVMMONS, IRELAND AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 7 (2d ed. 2000).
75. Hann M. Dotinga & Alfred H.A. Soons, The Netherlands and the Law of the Sea, in
THE LAW OF THE SEA: THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS MEMBER STATES 365, 367 (Tullio
Treves ed., 1997); Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal
Affairs,
United Nations,
Table of Ratifications/Accessions/Successions,
at
http://www.un.org/Depts /los/reference_files/status2002.pdf(last modified Feb. 27, 2002).
76. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 1, at 930.
77. For purposes of this Note, a discussion of the continental shelf, which is includes the
sea-bed and sub-soil of submarine areas, is not relevant to the question of whether Ireland
has jurisdiction over the Dutch abortion ship.
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1. Internal Waters
Under an absolutist view of sovereignty, states have authority to
exercise jurisdiction over foreign vessels regarding activities that take place
while the vessel is in port. 78 This is because ports are considered part of the
internal waters, and internal waters are treated as if tney are part of the land
of the state. Although the LOSC is silent on the issue of coastal state
control over internal waters, such authority can be inferred from Article
2(1) where internal waters are equated with land territory.79 Furthermore,
the LOSC and the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention do not provide any
limitations on the criminal or civil jurisdiction of a local state over foreign
vessels in its port. 80
However, most states rarely exercise jurisdiction over a foreign vessel
in port, and instead recognize the French modification rule. 81 Under this
rule, coastal states do not exercise jurisdiction over matters that are
considered related purely to the "internal economy" of the foreign vessel. 82
Instead, jurisdiction is only exercised when the activity in question affects
the local state and threatens the peace of the port. 83 .
2. Territorial Seas

The sovereignty of a coastal state extends beyond its land territory and
internal waters to the territorial sea. 84 The LOSC provides that states can
claim a territorial sea of up to twelve nautical miles from their shores. 85
However, an exercise of sovereignty is "subject to this Convention and to
other rules of internationallaw.,,86
One major limitation on the exercise of sovereignty over ships in the
territorial sea is the right of innocent passage to which· ships of all states are
entitled to under the LOSC. 87 Passage includes navigation for the purpose
of calling at a portfacility.88 Although passage must be continuous and
expeditious, stopping and anchoring are included within the definition of
passage so long as it is incidental to ordinary navigation or necessary due to
bad weather or some sort of distress. 89
Article 19 includes a lengthy definition of the meaning of innocent

78. Ted L. McDonnan, Port State En/orcement: A Comment on Article 218 o/the 1982
Law o/the Sea Convention, 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 305, 308 (1997).
79. ld.
80. ld. at 309.
81. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 1, at 950.
82. McDonnan, supra note 78, at 308.
83. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 1, at 950.
84. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 73, at art. 2(1).
85. ld. at art. 3.
86. 1d. at art. 2(3)
87. ld. at art. 17.
88. See id. at art. I8(I)(b).
89. See id. at art. 18(2).
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passage. 90 The article states that, "[p]assage is innocent so long as it is not
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State.,,91 The
article lists numerous activities that are considered prejudicial. 92 Although
the LOSC allows for an extension of sovereignty up to twelve nautical
miles from the baseline of the coast, the right of innocent passage greatly
preserves the freedom of navigation by discouraging coastal state
regulation over foreign vessels.
The LOSC provides limitations over when a coastal state should assert
jurisdiction over a foreign ship in territorial waters. Coastal states are not
permitted to exercise criminal jurisdiction on board a foreign ship passing
through the territorial sea with regard to any crime committed on board
during its passage unless one of the exceptions are met, such as if the
consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State or if the nature of the
crime would disturb the peace of the country or the good order of the
territorial sea. 93 However, there is no limitation on asserting jurisdiction
90. See Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 73, at art. 19.
91. Jd. at art. 19(1).
92. Jd. at art. 19(2). The article states:
Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered prejudicial to the peace, good
order or security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in any
of the following activities:
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity, or political independence of the coastal State, or in
any other manner in violation of the principles of international
law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
(c) any act aimed at collecting infonnation to the prejudice of the
defence or security of the coastal State;
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defense or security
of the coastal State;
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft;
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military
device;
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person
contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and
regulations of the coastal State;
(h) any act of willful and serious pollution contrary to this
Convention;
(i) any fishing activities;
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities;
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication
or any other facilities or installations of the coastal State;
(I) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.
Jd.
93. Jd. at art. 27(1). The article states:
The criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State should not be exercised on
board a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea to arrest any person or
to conduct any investigation in connection with any crime committed on
board the ship during its passage, save only in the following cases:
(a) if the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State;
(b) if the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or
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over foreign ships navigating through the territorial sea after leaving
internal waters. 94 The article's purpose is to protect the traditional right of
innocent passage to the greatest extent possible, and the primacy of the
flag-state under which the ship is registered to exercise jurisdiction for
crimes committed on board a ship.
There are also limitations on the exercise of civil jurisdiction over
foreign ships. The coastal state cannot stop or divert a foreign ship from
passing through the territorial sea for purposes of exercising civil
jurisdiction. 95 In addition, the coastal state cannot arrest the ship for civil
proceedings, unless the ship itself incurs liabilities. 96 Similar to an exercise
of criminal jurisdiction, there are no limitations on the right of a coastal
state to arrest a foreign ship in territorial waters after it has left internal
waters. 97
3. Contiguous Zone
The LOSC also recognizes a contiguous zone, which includes the
waters contiguous to the territorial sea. States may not extend the
contiguous zone beyond twenty-four nautical miles from the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 98 States can exercise
control necessary within the contiguous zone to prevent and punish "the
infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws and
regulations within its territory or territorial sea.,,99 In effect, this provision
permits states to extend their jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea limit of
twelve miles with respect to certain prescribed areas of the law that are
breached within their territory or territorial sea. There is also a more
expansive view that states have jurisdiction over violations that occur
within the contiguous zone if the foreign vessel is about to enter or just left
the territorial sea. 100
4. Exclusive Economic Zone
The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) includes the area beyond the
territorial sea: States can claim an EEZ of up to 200 nautical miles from
the good order of the territorial sea;
if the assistance of the local authorities has been requested by
the master of the ship or by a diplomatic agent or consular
officer of the flag State; or
(d) if such measures are necessary for the suppression of illicit
traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances.

(c)

Id.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 73, at art. 27(2).
Id. at art. 28(1).
Id. at art. 28(2).
Id. at art. 28(3).
98. Id. at art. 33(2).
99. Id. at art. 33(1).
100. D.G. Stephens, The Impact of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention on the Conduct of
Peacetime Naval/Military Operations, 29 CAL. W.INT'LLJ. 283,290 (1999).
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the baselines from where the length of the territorial sea is measured. 101
The LOSC grants rights to exercise jurisdiction with respect to: "(i) the
establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures, (ii)
marine scientific research, and (iii) the protection and preservation of the
marine environment.,,102
In addition, all states are entitled to the same rights in the EEZ as
provided in the high seas relating to the freedom of navigation, overflight,
laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other purposes that are
compatible with the EEZ provisions of the Convention. 103 Limitations on
the assertion of jurisdiction on the high seas are also applicable to the EEZ
unless they are incompatible with other provisions of the LOSC. 104
5. High Seas

The high seas constitutes "all parts of the seas that are not included in
the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial seas or in the internal waters
of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.,,105 The
LOSC codifies the customary rule that the high seas are open to all States
and lists the various freedoms that are included. 106 Furthermore, the high
seas are "reserved for peaceful purposes" and no state may claim any part
of the high seas subject to its sovereignty. 107
The LOSC also includes the customary rule that ships on the high seas
are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state under which the
ship is registered. 108 However, there are exceptions expressly provided for
in international treaties or under the LOSC, which include ships engaged in
slave transportation, piracy, and unauthorized broadcasting. I 09

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 73, at arts. 55, 57.
/d. at art. 56(1 )(b).
/d. at art. 58(1).
/d. at art. 58(2).
/d. at art. 86.
!d. at art. 87(1). The article states:
The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked.
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this
Convention imd by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia,
both for coastal and land-locked States:
(a) freedom of navigation;
(b) freedom of overflight;
(c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations
permitted under intemationallaw, subject to Part VI;
(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down m
section 2;
(t) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII.

/d.
107. Convention on the Law ofthe Sea, supra note 73, at arts. 88, 89.
108. !d. at art. 92.
109. /d. at arts. 99-100, 109.
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C. IRELAND AND THE LAW OF THE SEA
As an island state with a long coastline and an extensive continental
shelf, Ireland maintains tremendous interest in the international law of the
sea and its development. In fact, Irish dry land only makes up 10% of its
offshore zones. IIO Although Ireland has a small ocean-going merchant fleet
and navy, the country has substantial interest in fishery resources. I I I
Consequently, Ireland has participated in all three of the U.N.
Conferences on the Law of the Sea. Although Ireland signed the Geneva
Conventions on the Law of the Sea, Ireland never ratified the
Conventions. I 12 It appears that the Convention on Conservation of Living
Resources on the High Seas was considered for ratification, however it was
determined that it contained provisions which might be interpreted to
prevent Ireland from establishing an exclusive fishery zone beyond its
territorial seas. 113 Regarding the other three conventions, one commentator
has suggested that non-ratification was "due to lethargy rather than
objections in principle" since Ireland's maritime legislation, the Maritime
Jurisdiction Act of 1959 (MJA), contains provisions that are identical or
very similar to the Convention on the Territorial Sea. 114
1. Internal Waters and Territorial Sea
The MJA originally provided for a three-mile territorial sea limit. 115
However, the MJA was amended in 1987 to claim the maximum twelve
nautical miles under the LOSC. 116 This amendment came into force on
September 1, 1988.117
The right of innocent passage is only mentioned once in the MJA in
relation to internal waters formerly considered part of the territorial seas or
high sea areas enclosed by straight baselines, e.g. bays.118 Although the
MJA does not interpret the right of innocent passage, official statements at
the UNCLOS III demonstrate that Ireland was against a restrictive
definition of innocent passage. ll9
Offenses committed within Irish internal waters or territorial waters by
means of or on board a foreign ship are subject to Irish criminal
jurisdiction. l20 However, in order to prosecute an alien for an offense
committed in territorial waters on board 'a foreign ship, a certification from

110.
111.
112.
113.
114,
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

SYMMONS,

supra note 74, at I.

ld. at 2,
ld. at 3.

ld.
ld. at 4,
Maritime Jurisdiction Act, § 3 (1959).
SYMMONS, supra note 74, at 76.
ld. at 76 n.64.
See Maritime Jurisdiction Act, § 5 (1959).
SYMMONS, supra note 74, at 85.
Maritime Jurisdiction Act, § 10 (1959).
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the Minister of External Affairs is required before proceedings can be
Clearly, this provision provides safeguards for aliens,
instituted. 121
however only with regard to offenses committed in the territorial seas. 122
No such certificate is required for offenses committed by aliens in internal
waters. 123
The interesting question is whether Ireland has adopted the "peace of
the port" principle. Major seafaring nations such as the United Kingdom,
France, and the United States apply this doctrine. 124 This author was
unable to find any Irish case law that establishes an adherence or rejection
of this principle or that addresses the extent to which Ireland asserts port
state jurisdiction over foreign vessels. However, it may be inferred that
Ireland would follow English case law, which clearly recognizes that host
states should not exercise authority over a foreign vessel in port, unless the
conduct has sufficiently affected the port state's interests. 125
2. Contiguous Zone
Although the LOSC permits states to claim a contiguous zone of up to
an additional twelve miles from the edge of the territorial sea, Ireland does
not claim a contiguous zone separate from the breadth of the territorial sea,
nor is there any mention of such a zone in the MJA. 126 No coastal state is
obligated to claim this zone since the LOSC uses permissive language. 127
At present, Ireland only exercises jurisdiction over the territorial sea of
twelve miles.
Therefore, regulation of Ireland's custom, fiscal,
immigration, and sanitary laws does not extend beyond the territorial sea.
3. Exclusive Economic Zone
The MJA recognizes a separate exclusive fishery zone, however there
is no mention of an exclusive economic zone.l2S Although in 1976 Ireland
established a 200-mile exclusive fishery zone (EFZ) in a statutory order the Maritime Jurisdiction (Exclusive Fisher Limits) Order - Ireland has not
claimed a 200-mile exclusive economic zone.129 Therefore, there seems to
be a jurisdictional gap outside the twelve-mile territorial limit over matters

121. Id. § II.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See Jason M. Schupp, The Clay Bill: Testing the Limits of Port State Sovereignty, 18
MD. 1. [NT'L L. & TRADE 199, 207-08 (1994) (Describing the "internal economy rule,"
which states, "port states will assume jurisdiction when, in their opinion, the peace or
tranquility of the port is disturbed. ").
125. !d. at 210.
126. SVMMONS, supra note 74, at 125.
127. Id.
128. Maritime Jurisdiction Act, § 6 (1959).
129. Clive R. Symmons, Ireland and the Law of the Sea, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS MEMBER STATES, supra note 75, at 261,280.
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that do no constitute a breach of fishery laws. 13o This is exemplified by the
jurisdictional problems Irish authorities have had dealing with the
intentional ramming of Irish fishing vessels by Spanish trawlers within the
200-mile EFZ.131
4. High Seas
As an island state, Ireland views freedom on the high seas as a
fundamental principle of international law that ensures freedom of
navigation between countries.
In practice, Ireland has consistently
followed the principle that jurisdiction on the high seas belongs to the
foreign vessel's flag state. 132

III. ANALYSIS
Principles of international jurisdiction, international law of the sea, and
Irish law of the sea help clarify the potential arguments for and against Irish
jurisdictional authority over either Dutch or Irish nationals during various
stages of the abortion ship's travel.
A. JURISDiCTiON PRIOR TO ARRIVAL OF THE ABORTlON SHIP

Before the arrival of the abortion ship, Ireland clearly has no
jurisdictional authority over the Dutch ship while it is on the high seas.
The LOSe and Irish practice have shown the utmost respect for the
freedom of navigation on the high seas. At this point, since Dutch
nationals aboard the ship have not engaged in any activity that might put
them within the jurisdiction of Ireland, the Netherlands retains exclusive
jurisdiction. This holds true when the ship enters within the 200-mile zone,
since Ireland only claims an exclusive fishery zone, which is unrelated to
the activities aboard an abortion ship. Even if Ireland claimed an EEZ, the
abortion ship's activity does not fall within the jurisdictional provisions of
the LOSe. Furthennore, since Ireland does not claim a contiguous zone,
the abortion ship is still effectively outside the jurisdictional purview of
Ireland beyond the twelve-mile territorial sea.
However, when the boat enters the twelve-mile territorial limit, it has
essentially entered the sovereign territory of Ireland, as recognized under
the LOSe and Irish law. Yet, the LOSe explicitly provides for the right of
innocent passage, thus limiting a state's ability to exclude foreign vessels
from territorial waters. Therefore, the relevant issue is whether the ship's
passage qualifies as innocent.
Under the LOSe, "Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to
the peace, good order or security of the coastal State.,,133 The enumeration
130.
131.
132.
133.

/d. at 282.
fd.
/d. at 294.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 73, at art. 19(1).
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of prejudicial activities seems to make "innocence" dependent on the
conduct that occurs during passage. 134 In effect, this prevents Ireland from
determining the non-innocence of passage by the character of the ship.
Ireland may argue that although the conduct of the Dutch abortion ship is
lawful, the purpose of the passage to perform abortions on Irish nationals
makes the transit non-innocent. Although Ireland views the passage of the
Dutch ship as morally corrupt, and therefore non-innocent, Article 19(2)
has been interpreted as an exhaustive list of activities that are noninnocent. 135 Since the Dutch nationals have not conducted any activities
that are listed, they are effectively passing through territorial waters in
accordance with the LOSC.
Essentially Ireland has no means to prevent the passage of the abortion
ship because it has not engaged in any of the proscribed non-innocent
activities. Hence, Ireland may not impede the ship's transit through
territorial waters. Furthermore, since no illegal activity has occurred
during the ship's passage, Ireland cannot assert jurisdiction over the Dutch
nationals.
B. JURISDICTION OVER THE ABORTION SHIP IN PORT
Once the abortion ship arrives in port, Irish jurisdictional authority is at
its greatest since Ireland has both prescriptive and enforc.ement jurisdiction.
Women on Waves listed counseling, pregnancy testing, and workshops on
reproductive health as activities to be conducted while in port. 136 The
Fourteenth Amendment of the Irish Constitution provides that the Eighth
Amendment, protecting the life of the unborn, "shall not limit the freedom
to obtain or make available, in the State, subject to such conditions as may
be established by law, information relating to services lawfully available in
another state.,,137 In March 1995, the Abortion Information Act was passed
which limits the right to receive such information. The Act addresses how
and under what circumstances publishers of abortion material and
organizations rendering pregnancy counseling can provide information
regarding abortion. 138 The Act specifically prohibits counselors from
advocating or promoting abortions. 139 In addition, counselors are not
permitted to make an appointment or any .other arrangements for an
134. See id. at art. 19(2).
135. Although the interpretation of Article 19(2) as an exhaustive list was included in only
a bilateral agreement between the United States and Soviet Union, it clarifies the concept of
innocent passage for the rest of the international community. Lieutenant Commander John
W. Rolph, Freedom of Navigation and the Black Sea Bumping Incident: How "Innocent"
Must Innocent Passage Be?, 135 MIL. L. REv. 137, 163 (1992).
136. Women on Waves, Activities, at hrtp://www.womeonwaves.org/e/e_activities.html
(last visited May 1,2003).
137. Art. 40.3.3, Constitution ofIreland, 1983.
138. Keith S. Kogler, Ire/and's Abortion Information Act of 1995, 29 VAND. 1.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1117, 1137 (1996).
139. Id. at 1137-38.

Winter 2003]

MAKING WAVES

125

abortion on behalf of a woman. 140 A violation of the Infonnation Act
creates civil liability of up to £ I ,500. 141
The Dutch pro-choice activists could be acting in violation of the
Abortion Infonnation Act if counselors advocate the tennination of a
pregnancy. Ireland can argue that the mere context of the counseling - on
board a ship outfitted to perfonn abortions on the high seas - constitutes a
promotion of pregnancy tennination. In addition, the Dutch nationals
would also be in violation of the provision prohibiting counselors from
arranging abortions since they are acting within dual roles as both
counselors and abortion doctors. Thus, the Dutch nationals may be liable
for violations of the Abortion Infonnation Act.
However, it· is customary under international law to refrain from
asserting jurisdiction over foreign vessels unless the activity disturbs the
peace of the port.142 Historically port states have refrained from exercising
jurisdiction in situations involving wages, collective bargaining, necessary
discipline, and crimes committed on board. 143 Two cases that established
this customary rule involved assaults committed by American seamen on
American flag vessels, Newton and Sally, located in French ports. 144
France declined to assert jurisdiction because the conduct was deemed
insufficient to disturb the peace of the port. 145 Yet, in the Wildenhus case,
the United States Supreme Court held that the murder of a Belgian
crewman by another Belgian crewmember on board a Belgian flag vessel
while in a U.S. port constituted activity that disturbs the peace. 146 The
Court stated that: "If the thing done ... is of a character to affect those on
shore or in the port when it becomes known, the fact that only those on the
ship saw it when it was done is a matter of no moment.,,147 The Court also
referred to the universal condemnation of murder as another justification
for asserting jurisdiction. 148
In the case of the abortion ship, providing infonnation advocating
abortion does not rise to the same level as murder, although Irish pro-life
forces would certainly argue to the contrary. Although such conduct may
be morally condemned by Ireland, the activity in question is a violation
only of civil law, not criminal law. Furthennore, advocating abortion is not
conduct that is universally condemned.
On the other hand, if the Dutch pro-choice activists' conduct incites
sufficient public response, a strong argument could be made that Ireland
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 1138.
/d.
See discussion at supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
Schupp, supra note 124, at 208.
/d.
Id. at 208-09.
Id. at 212-13.
Wi1denhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1, 17 (1887).
Id. at 17-18.
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may assert jurisdiction. Surprisingly, when the Aurora arrived in the
Dublin port there was no sign of protest. 149 When one journalist questioned
a member of Youth Defense, one of Ireland's most militant anti-abortion
organizations, he responded that Dr. Gomperts was "just pulling a pUblicity
stunt."ISO Therefore, the ability of Ireland to assert jurisdiction over the
foreign vessel rests to a considerable degree on the intensity of the public
response. However, Ireland may argue that a potential disturbance of the
peace is sufficient to justify asserting jurisdiction. Such an argument
would be similar to the reasoning adopted in Wildenhus when the Court
stated:
It is not alone the publicity of the act, or the noise and clamor
which attends it, that fixes the nature of the crime, but the act itself.
If that is of a character to awaken public interest when it becomes
known, it is a "disorder" the nature of which is to affect the
community at large, and consequently to invoke the power of the
local government whose people have been disturbed by what was
done. lSI

Another question raised is whether Ireland may enjoin its citizens from
boarding the abortion ship. Clearly, Ireland has jurisdictional authority
over its own citizens under both the territorial and nationality principles.
However, Attorney General v. X established that there is a fundamental
right to travel. IS2 In addition, the Thirteenth Amendment of the Irish
Constitution recognizes the right of a woman to travel abroad to terminate
her pregnancy. IS) Therefore, it is doubtful that Ireland would be successful
in preventing Irish nationals from boarding the Aurora.
C. JURISDICTION OVER THE ABORTION SHIP UPON LEA VJNO PORT
After the abortion ship leaves port, the vessel remains under Irish
jurisdiction twelve miles from the baseline. Normally under the LOSC a
state should not assert civil jurisdiction over a vessel passing through the
territorial waters unless there are liabilities incurred by the ship itself.
However, there are no limitations on civil jurisdiction to levy execution or
arrest of a foreign ship in the territorial seas after leaving internal waters. IS4
Therefore, if Ireland finds a violation of the Abortion Information Act, and
the ship has already left internal waters, Ireland may still assert jurisdiction
within its territorial waters under international law.
If the Dutch nationals attempted to or performed abortions within the

149.
ISO.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Corbett, supra note 39, at 26.
/d.
Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. at 18.
See discussion at supra note 23 and accompanying text.
See discussion at supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 73, at art. 28.
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territorial waters, Ireland could certainly assert criminal jurisdiction under
Irish and international law. Irish law permits criminal jurisdiction within
its territorial waters,155 and international law permits jurisdiction if the
nature of the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State or if the
nature of the crime would disturb the peace of the country or good order of
the territorial sea. 156 Ireland would have a strong argument for asserting
jurisdiction under either exception. First, Ireland may argue that abortion
within the territorial seas has profound consequences for the Irish nation by
diluting the authority of the government to legislate on social issues,
depriving would-be fathers of children, and depriving the Irish unborn of
the right to life under the Irish Constitution. These are just some of the
arguments Ireland may advance.
In addition, the performance of abortions off the coast of Ireland would
most certainly disturb the peace of the country. Although Dr. Gomperts
was met with few signs of protest, if she had actually performed abortions
within Ireland's territorial waters, the proximity and the reality of the
situation would most likely create significant public outcry. There was
little protest upon Dr. Gomperts' arrival because many thought she was
bluffing or just trying to stir up media attention. However, if her mission
had done more than raise awareness, it is likely that pro-choice groups and
religious organizations would have created a greater uproar.
Furthermore, performance of abortions ·within territorial waters could
arguably be considered non-innocent passage under subsection (I), which
makes non-innocent "any other activity not having a direct bearing on
passage.,,157 Although this provision is excessively vague, Ireland may
assert that abortion operations do not have any direct relationship to
navigation, and therefore passage is non-innocent. Therefore, Ireland could
seize the vessel, thus preventing it from passing through territorial waters.
D. JURISDICTION OVER THE ABORTION SHIP ON THE HIGH SEAS

Beyond the twelve-mile territorial waters zone, the ship is not
technically in the high seas according to the definition under the LOSC.
The provisions regarding the high seas "apply to all parts of the sea that are
not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the
internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic
State.,,158 Instead, the boat is located in the EFZ. Although technically
performing abortions outside the twelve-mile zone is within the exclusive
economic fishery zone, all of the freedoms afforded to the high seas are
also granted to the EEZ. Since the Aurora would be outside the territorial
jurisdiction of Ireland, the issue is whether Ireland may assert extraISS.
156.
157.
158.

Maritime Jurisdiction Act, § 10 (1959).
Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 73, at art. 27(1).
Jd. at art. 19(2)(1).
Jd. at art. 86.
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territorial jurisdiction over a foreign vessel perfonning abortions in
international waters.
The LOSe only grants jurisdiction over a foreign vessel in the high
seas in cases of slave trafficking, piracy, and unauthorized broadcasting.
The only category under which the perfonnance of abortions could
possibly fall under is piracy. Article 101 of the LOSe states:
[Piracy includes] (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or act
of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i)
on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons
or property on board such ship or aircraft .... ,,159
There are several problems with Ireland asserting universal jurisdiction
over the abortion ship. First, the definition of piracy only includes illegal
acts of violence against another ship, and such persons or property on
board such ship. However, it has been suggested that since facts
supporting charges of aircraft piracy have occurred on a single plane, in the
interest of consistency, high seas piracy can also occur on one ship.160
Even so, it is questionable whether the perfonnance of abortions on
high seas may be considered an illegal act of violence under international
law. Although Ireland perceives the act as the unlawful killing of the
unborn, there is no widespread agreement that abortion is a sufficiently
heinous offense that justifies subjecting foreign vessels to jurisdiction by
any state.
In addition, the definition of piracy requires that the acts be committed
for private ends. Here, Dr. Gomperts' mission is more an act of political
resistance rather than private gain. She intends to perfonn abortions for
free or for a nominal fee, therefore it is difficult to argue that there is an
economic incentive at work. Instead, Dr. Gomperts has approached
abortion as an international human rights issue and intends to highlight the
restrictive abortion laws in Ireland and provide women with a choice. 161
Although the abortion ship does not fall within universal jurisdiction
under the LOSe, customary principles of international law may provide a
basis for extra-territorial jurisdiction. Ireland could certainly assert
jurisdiction over Irish passengers on board the abortion ship under the
nationality principle and over the Dutch nationals under the passive
personality principle since they would be considered perpetrators of a
crime against the Irish unborn ..
However, although extra-territorial jurisdiction IS theoretically
159. Id. at art. 101.
160. Elissa Steglich, Hiding in the Hulls: Attacking the Practice of High Seas Murder of
Stowaways Through Expanded Criminal Jurisdiction, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1323, 1340-41
(2000).
161. Corbett, supra note 39, at 24.
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plausible, it is questionable whether Ireland would assert jurisdiction
because of the right to travel to member states of the European Union for
an abortion. The Netherlands is a member of the European Union, and
therefore an Irish woman may travel to the Netherlands to procure an
abortion without fear of prosecution. In this case, since Dr. Gomperts is
using a Dutch-registered ship that is subject to Dutch sovereignty on the
high seas, the Irish women have theoretically traveled to another European
Union state. Ireland may argue that the Thirteenth Amendment only
contemplated travel to the territorial land of another state. Yet, considering
Ireland's traditional respect for the freedom of navigation on the high seas
and recognition of flag state jurisdiction on the high seas, it would be very
difficult for Ireland to make a convincing argument that the women have
not effectively traveled outside the jurisdiction of Ireland. Therefore,
although jurisdiction is relatively easy to obtain on nationality grounds, the
women most likely would evade prosecution on substantive grounds.
In addition, Ireland may argue that the Dutch nationals are within
extra-territorial jurisdiction under the passive personality principle, which
justifies jurisdiction over perpetrators of crimes against Irish nationals.
Since the Irish Constitution recognizes the right to life of the unborn and
abortion is a criminal offense, Ireland could argue that the State has an
interest in protecting the life of its nationals and bringing those who
jeopardize that life to justice. Yet Ireland will have difficulty asserting this
argument because abortion is not a crime within the Netherlands and the
law of the flag state normally applies on foreign vessels on the high seas.
Another potential theory that would justify extra-territorial jurisdiction
is the protective principle. In order for jurisdiction to be justified under the
protective principle, the offense must have harmful or possibly harmful
effects to the national interests of the state claiming jurisdiction. 162 The
protective theory was designed so that states may protect themselves from
offenses that damage or threaten state security, sovereignty, treasury, or
governmental functions. 163
Ireland could argue that the performance of abortions in international
seas threatens its moral sovereignty to determine what conduct is deemed
offensive. Although Ireland is the only member of the European Union
that has remained resistant to the legalization of abortion, European Union
law typically defers to members states on issues of morality under the
margin of appreciation doctrine of the European Convention of Human
Rights. 164 Ireland may argue that although the abortions are performed

162. Christopher L. Blakesley, Criminal Law: United States Jurisdiction Over
Extraterritorial Crime, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109, 1134-35 (1982).
163. ld. at 1137-38.
164. Angela Thompson, International Protection o/Women 's Rights~' An Analysis o/Open
Door Counselling Ltd. and Dublin Well Woman Centre v. Ireland, 12 B.U. INT'L LJ. 371,
396-97 (1994).
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outside Irish territory, the potential effects of an abortion ship in the
aggregate would make Irish law meaningless if virtually any pregnant
woman could tenninate her pregnancy outside the twelve-mile territorial
limit.
Although abortions perfonned on the high seas do not pose a security
risk to Ireland, the acts do threaten to impose on Ireland's capability to
regulate the conduct and morality of its own citizens. However, this
argument interferes with the primary goal of international law of the sea,
which is to maintain freedom of navigation and prevent ambiguity and
subjective decision-making regarding jurisdictional authority. If states
were allowed to assert extra-territorial jurisdiction based on morality
arguments, the floodgates would open to all sorts of jurisdictional claims.
Ireland may also refer to Article 300 of the LOSC which provides that,
"State Parties shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this
Convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms
recognized in this Convention in a manner which would not constitute an
abuse of right.,,165 The language of this provision indicates that the LOSC
mandates that states exercise their rights without abusing the freedoms
guaranteed. Arguably, Ireland and other states would view this activity as
an abuse of high seas freedoms to undennine Irish sovereignty. Since
perfonning abortions is not within the contemplated purposes for ensuring
freedom of the high seas, such as ease of navigation and sharing of fishing
resources, the Dutch nationals' conduct may be perceived as a
manipulation of international law and an improper attempt to politicize on
an international level a traditionally domestic issue.
On the other hand, pro-choice advocates would argue that such conduct
vindicates women's right to reproductive choice and fights against what
many activists perceive to be a violation of international human rights by
denying access to abortion services to those women who cannot afford to
travel abroad. Perhaps an abuse of the law of the sea is a lesser evil than
turning a blind eye to the needs of thousands of Irish women.
Most likely, the parties to the LOSC did not consider how to resolve
situations where the nature of the conduct implicates morality rather than
security, environmental, or resource interests. Since the parties to the
Convention are unlikely to reconvene in the near future to consider whether
such uses of the high seas should be pennissible, the question remains
unanswered until Dr. Gomperts or another human rights activist
successfully tests the limits of international law. In that event, Ireland may
invoke a dispute resolution mechanism under the LOSC.

IV. CONCLUSION
Since Dr. Gomperts was unable to fulfill all of the goals of her mission
165. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 73, at art. 300 (emphasis added).

Winter 2003]

MAKING WAVES

131

and perform abortions on the high seas, it remains to be seen to what extent
a state may protect itself from challenges to its moral independence and
how the international community would respond to such use of the high
seas. As the trend toward the liberalization of abortion law continues and
the world becomes increasingly inter-dependent, Ireland is under increasing
pressure to harmonize its laws with the rest of Europe. Although there are
potential arguments that Ireland may raise in asserting jurisdiction under
the LOSe and customary law, the Irish government may be placed in a
difficult position of choosing between maintaining freedom of navigation
or protecting its own societal interest in preserving the protection of the
Irish unborn.
The abortion ship provides a powerful example of how activists can
successfully circumvent domestic law by crossing international boundaries.
Interestingly, the high seas may provide a new battleground for debate in
the twenty-first century as Dr. Gomperts' idea has attracted the attention of
Australian doctor Philip Nitschke, who plans to buy a Dutch-registered ship
in order to set up a euthanasia clinic that would travel to countries where
the practice is illeg~l.'66
Although the abortion ship may not be a definitive solution to the
restriction on women's right to choose in Ireland, it may be a temporary
answer for the potentially large number of women who cannot afford to
travel to states where abortion is legal. Perhaps even more significantly,
such action raises awareness and forces the abortion issue to the forefront
of the international community.

166. David Betty, Doctor Plans Euthanasia Boat in
2001, at 9.
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